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What characterizes the EU today is that it is not only a multi-level governance system, but 
also a multi-context system. The making of Europe does not just take place on different 
levels within the European political framework, executed and fostered by different groups of 
actors or institutions. Rather, it also happens in different and distinguishable social contexts – 
distinct functional, historical, and local frameworks of reasoning and action – that political 
science  alone  cannot  sufficiently  analyze  with  conventional  and  generalizing  models  of 
explanation.  The  European  law  is  such  a  context  and  it  should  be  perceived  as  a  self-
contained sphere governed by a specific logic and rationality that constitute a self-generating 
impetus  for  integration.  As  a  consequence,  Europe’s  legal  sphere  and  the  processes 
happening within its boundaries have to be carefully distinguished from politics. Following 
this line of argument, it will be shown that the perception of the European Court of Justice as 
an actor engaging in judicial politics or politically motivated expansionist lawmaking has to be 
rethought. Only by examining and analyzing the context of European law as an independent 
space  of  reasoning  and  action  may  the  role  of  Europe’s  high  court  in  the  process  of 
integration be adequately captured. 
 
Résumé:  
Ce  qui  caractérise  l’UE  aujourd’hui,  c’est  que  ce  n’est  pas  seulement  un  système  de 
gouvernance  multi-niveaux,  mais  aussi  un  système  multi-contexte.  La  construction  de 
l’Europe  n’a  pas  seulement  lieu  à  différents  niveaux  dans  le  cadre  politique  européen, 
exécuté et encouragée par différents groupes d’acteurs ou d’institutions. Au contraire, elle 
est aussi en cours dans des contextes sociaux différents et distincts – cadres fonctionnels, 
historiques et locaux de raisonnement et d'action – que la science politique seule ne peut 
pas analyser de façon satisfaisante grâce aux modèles classiques et généralisant. Le droit 
européen  constitue  un  contexte  de  ce  type  et  devrait  être  perçu  comme  une  sphère 
autonome régie par une logique spécifique et une rationalité qui constituent un moteur en soi 
du processus d’intégration européenne. Par conséquent, la sphère juridique de l’Europe et 
les  processus  qui  se  déroulent  à  l’intérieur  de  ses  limites  doivent  être  soigneusement 
distinguée  de  la  politique.  Dans  cette  perspective,  ce  texte  remet  en  cause  l’idée  selon 
laquelle la Cour de justice européenne serait un acteur politique et engagé en faveur d’une 
expansion juridique européenne. Ce n’est qu’en examinant et en analysant le contexte du 
droit européen comme un espace indépendant de raisonnement et d’action que le rôle de la 
haute cour de l’Europe dans le processus d’intégration pourra être correctement saisi. 
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Since the trailblazing works of Hjalte Rasmussen (1986, 1988), Joseph Weiler (1991, 
1993, 1994), and Cappelletti et al. (1985) in the late 1980s and early 1990s, European law as 
a factor of integration has increasingly moved into the focus of political science research. 
Ever  since,  the  European  Court  of  Justice  (ECJ),  as  the  central  actor  in  Europe’s  legal 
sphere, has attracted the interest of integration studies. But it is not just the law’s importance 
to integration and the ECJ’s central role that are widely accepted among scholars. There also 
seems  to  be  consensus  that  “integration  through  law”  (Weiler  1991)  can  be  analyzed 
adequately  by  adopting  the  theoretical  approaches  originally  invented  to  describe  and 
explain integration processes induced by politically motivated actors. Accordingly, EU law is 
no longer perceived as mere texts negotiated by various political actors and written down in 
the Treaties. Once passed, it is also supposed to be an instrument or tool for facilitating and 
advancing European unification by means of judicial interpretation – with the ECJ as its main 
proponent. Paradoxically, the law is also understood to constitute a new and distinct political 
arena  and  battleground  where,  in  addition  to  a  variety  of  actors  –  from  private  national 
litigants,  to  diverse  pro-integration  activists,  to  nation  states,  to  the  genuine  European 
institutions – the Court is trying to exert its influence and implement its interests by using 
rational strategies of enforcement (see Burley and Mattli 1993: 72, Bouwen and McCown 
2007).  It  will  be  shown,  however,  that  this  perception  of  the  rule  of  law  in  Europe  is  a 
momentous  misinterpretation  and  has  severe  consequences  for  the  perception  of  the 
legitimacy of European law. 
In an article recently published, Alter and Helfer rightly pointed out that “prevailing 
scholarship  puts  too  much  emphasis  on  the  self-interested  power-seeking  of  judges,  the 
importance of institutional design features, and the preferences of governments to explain 
lawmaking  by  international  courts”  (Alter  and  Helfer  2010:  563).  Yet,  they  did  not  go  far 
enough  in  their  criticism  to  fix  the  main  problem  underlying  current  debates.  The  core 
difficulty with contemporary studies is that they lack a substantial examination of the law 
itself, and therefore, of the ECJ’s work. They miss the possibilities and limitations arising 
from  Europe’s  unique  legal  community  and  treat  the  Court  as  a  political  as  well  as  an 
interest-rational actor steadily advocating for deeper integration.  
Within the given framework, both ideas are as fundamental as they are problematic. 
First, perceiving the ECJ as an actor engaging in pro-federalist politics (e.g. Stone Sweet 
2004: 232; Josselin and Marciano 2007; Alter 2009b: 44) ignores the legal and craft-bound 
foundations of its work. It obscures how embedded the Court is in the context of European 
law, as well as the options and restrictions resulting from that. Second, claiming the Court is 
a rational actor is not false per se, but the notion of what could be called a “trivial rationality”
2 
employed in the current debates is quite inflexible, mechanistic, and universalistic. It is a one-
size-fits-all-concept  that  could  be  described  as  a  linear  and  non-changeable  function 
connecting actor and action in a predetermined, unchangeable way without being influenced 
by  social  institutions  or  frameworks  of  reasoning  and  action.  Moreover,  the  concept  of 
rationality remains an analytical black box – an object that has a shape, but an unknowable 
content.  Ascribing  this  notion  of  rationality  to  the  ECJ  obstructs  the  view  of  the  broad 
                                                 
1 The author thanks Dr. Arif Ahmed, Prof. Catherine Barnard, Prof. Bengt Beutler, Prof. Thomas Bruha, Prof. Alan 
Dashwood, Prof. Renaud Dehousse, Dr. Geoffrey Edwards, Dr. Markus Gehring, Prof. Armin Hatje, Prof. Jane 
Heal,  Prof.  Christopher  Hill,  Prof.  Cord  Jakobeit,  Dr.  Julie  Smith  and  Dr.  Marianne  Takle  for  their 
advice, guidance, and many helpful comments on this research.
 
2  The  concept  possesses  all  features  of  what  Heinz  von  Foerster  once  called  a  “trivial  machine:”  It  is 
“characterized by a one-to-one relationship between its ‘input’ (stimulus, cause) and its ‘output’ (response, effect). 
[…] Since this relationship is determined once and for all, this is a deterministic system; and since an output once 
observed for a given input will be the same for the same input given later, this is also a predictable system” (von 
Foerster  2003:  208).  Therefore,  I  will  call  theories  relying  on  such  a  understanding  of  rationality  as  “trivial 
rationalistic,” or will refer to the underlying theory as “trivial rationalism.” The term is not meant to depreciative or 
degrading, but as a description of the typical explanatory mechanism in these rationalist theories.  A. Grimmel – Integration and the Context of Law: Why the European Court of Justice is not a Political Actor 
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foundation of shared legal knowledge and tradition that forms the core of the common legal 
system, and which must be the inevitable basis for the enduring acceptance of the whole 
integration project. It clouds the processes happening in the interior of Europe’s legal sphere 
and detracts from the fact that the legal system grew, developed, and was differentiated over 
time by means of law – not just politics.
3 Significantly, Alter and Helfer did not even consider 
a  judicial  explanation  in  their  study.  Instead,  merely  stating  the  importance  of  law,  they 
claimed  that  the  influence  of  “scholarly  and  practitioner  associations  that  united  pro-
integration advocates and worked to educate the larger legal community about the ECJ’s 
view  of  European  law”  (Alter  and  Helfer  2010:  584)  can  be  a  convincing  explanation  for 
expansive judicial lawmaking. But would it no be much more plausible to understand the 
demand  for  the  creation  of  legal  scholarship  as  a  logical  result  of  the  establishment  of 
European law itself? And would it not be necessary and only logical to first eliminate the 
possibility that there is an explanation for the Court’s expansive lawmaking within law before 
assuming a political setting and looking for “legal advocacy networks” (Ibid.: 585) enforcing 
their preferences? 
This article will offer an alternative approach highlighting the options and limitations of 
reasonable action within the context of European law. It will be shown that there are good 
reasons to shift the focus away from actors and their interests and to concentrate more on 
the “rules of recognition” (see Hart 1961) effective in a specific functional, historical, and local 
framework of action. This does not imply that neither actors nor institutions play any role in 
the  litigation  processes  happening  in  Europe.  Political  science  research,  especially 
constructivist  studies  in  the  last  two  decades,  have  done  a  convincing  job  of  showing 
theoretically  as  well  as  empirically  how  various  institutions  and  norms  are  able  to  shape 
action and socialize actors’ interests (for an overview see Zürn and Checkel 2005). However, 
to  derive  convincing  explanations  about  “integration  through  law”  in  Europe,  one  must 
inevitably engage systematically with the law itself and perceive it as a self-contained space 
of reasoning and action. In other words: it is about understanding the rules of the game, not 
just about the motives of players for playing the game or the way the game shapes the 
thoughts and actions of the players.  
This  proposed  shift  towards  the  context  does  not  entail  a  naïve  or  idealistic 
perspective on law as a world where interests can never prevail and where actors are striving 
for justice and nothing but justice. Quite the contrary: interests have and have always had 
their place in law. Dehousse is right when he states: “good political science cannot ignore 
legal constraints, just as lawyers must make sense of the politics of laws, i.e. the way in 
which  legal  arguments  are  used  by  a  variety  of  actors  to  pursue  their  own  interests” 
(Dehousse 2002: 123). Put another way, although there might be interests in law, there are 
also strict and commonly accepted rules defining who might pursue legal claims, how these 
have to be brought forward, and which forms of argument are legitimate and which have to 
be refused – in sum, the rules of law.
4 For this reason, the approach favored in this article 
must  be  understood  as  a  “nothing-without-law  approach,”  rather  than  a  “nothing-but-law 
approach.”   
The model of context analysis outlined here offers a systematic analytical framework 
for approaching and assessing the role of law in Europe. As a contribution to the discussion 
about “integration through law,” it aims to close a gap in current research. Unlike earlier 
approaches and studies, such as that of Cappelletti et al., this context perspective will not 
focus on the role of law in an overall political integration process and how it “defines many of 
the political actors and the framework within which they operate, controlling and limiting their 
                                                 
3  For  a  close  discussion  on  “trivial  rationalism”  and  the  possibility  to  transform  the  notion  of  rationality,  see 
Grimmel 2010a, 2010b, 2011. 
4 For example, nobody would insist that plaintiff and defendant or their advocates are free of interests in their 
case. Interests might also be legally relevant, e.g. legitimate interest in the right of privacy or health protection. 
Judges, on the contrary, can never claim legitimate interests. They are always bound to neutrality and have to 
apply the laws by the means of law.  A. Grimmel – Integration and the Context of Law: Why the European Court of Justice is not a Political Actor 
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actions and relations” (Cappelletti 1985: 4). Rather, context analysis concerns itself with how 
legal frameworks, especially the European one, function; how they change over time, and 
how they impose demands for reasoning and action on actors – judicial as well as political 
ones. One can even take the argument one step further and say: by entering the context of 
law, every actor becomes a legal actor or, more precisely, every actor compulsorily takes a 
legal role and therefore is unavoidably bound to certain legal rules.  
The article will begin with a brief overview of the central theoretical approaches to the 
European Court offered by political science so far. It will be argued that although all these 
different analyses and their underlying explanatory patterns seem to offer an abundance of 
accounts, in effect, they all share a similar understanding of the ECJ as actor predetermining 
the  perception  of  the  rule  of  law  in  Europe.  In  a  second  step,  it  will  be  shown  that  this 
disregards the fact that European law itself, to some extent, sets the rules of the game and 
must  be  understood  as  an  independent  variable  providing  reason  for  action.  The  central 
thesis of this article is that we have to take into account not only the actors in the field of law, 
but first and foremost, generate knowledge about the law itself to be able to understand the 
European integration through law. The latter can only be done by systematically examining 
and analyzing the idiosyncrasies and rules of the law stored within a certain social context of 
reasoning and action. Third, by way of debating some of its best-known landmark cases and 
doctrines of the “foundational period” it will be examined how the ECJ established autonomy 
of  European  law.  This  empirical  evidence  will  outline  how  integration  theory  has  to  re-
conceptualize both European law and the Court to draw a more realistic picture of both. The 
article will conclude with some general remarks, and an overview of why such a contextual 
approach should be used to develop a better and much more promising understanding of the 
process of integration in Europe. 
 
1.  The “Rational Politics” of Legal Integration – a Critical Appraisal 
Scientific engagement with the ECJ started at a surprisingly late point in the history of 
European unification – long after the Court had rendered some of its most fundamental and 
momentous judgments. The first major debate in political science about the role of high court 
decision-making  in  the  integration  process  arose  in  the  early  1990s  between  scholars  of 
neorationalism  and  neofunctionalism,  and  was  later  joined  by  proponents  of  liberal 
intergovernmentalism  and  supranationalism  (see  Garrett  1992,  1995;  Burley/Mattli  1993, 
1998; Alter 1996, 1998, 2000; Garrett, Keleman and Schulz 1998; Kilroy 1999; Mattli and 
Slaughter 1995; Moravcsik 1995; Pollack 1997; Slaughter, Stone Sweet and Weiler 1998; 
Stone Sweet 1999, 2004, 2005; Scharpf 1999, 2009; Shapiro and Stone Sweet 2002; for an 
overview see also Schepel 2000; Conant 2007, 2002; Grimmel and Jakobeit 2009). What is 
remarkable  here  is  that  none  of  these  theorists  endeavored  to  formulate  a  tailor-made, 
empirical-analytical theory to explain “integration through law.” Instead, they all transferred 
existent approaches, models, and concepts from politics to the field of law. It seems that their 
project was solely to show how their preferred and already elaborated explanatory structures 
could be used to explain the ever-growing influence of the Court, which could no longer be 
ignored in the 1980s. More precisely, research was obviously driven neither by the ambition 
to develop an understanding of European law or “integration through law,” but to show the 
superiority of certain theoretical presumptions. 
This venture was afflicted with great and, in the end, unsolvable problems right from 
the beginning, due to the fact that these theories had originally been designed to explain 
politically steered and elite-driven integration processes. Although they were quite convincing 
in the early years of the EC/EU, which had been widely shaped by the interests of a growing 
group of states and their political leaders, these explanations were unsuitable and insufficient 
to examine the rule of law in Europe. Over the years, the EU has evolved into a highly 
complex  entity  in  which  integration  implies  far  more  than  governmental  bargains, 
negotiations at roundtables, or decision-making in Brussels. By incorporating the ECJ into 
these  theories,  and  consequently  classifying  it  as  one  more  political  player  among  other A. Grimmel – Integration and the Context of Law: Why the European Court of Justice is not a Political Actor 
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actors and institutions trying to shape the EU in the pursuit of its own rational interests (see 
e.g. Vanberg 1998), no attention was paid to the idiosyncrasies of law, nor to the fact that the 
ECJ  is  delimited  by  a  craft-bound,  legal  rationality.
5  Put  another  way,  law  and  legal 
integration were considered politics hiding behind a façade of legalese: 
Neorationalism claims that the “justices’ primary objective is to extend the ambit of European 
law and their authority to interpret it” (Garrett 1995: 173). To advance this purely political 
agenda and safeguard its position of power vis-à-vis the nation states, the ECJ has to act 
rationally in the sense that judges try to foresee the reactions of the member states to make 
sure  a  boycott  does  not  undermine  the  Court’s  authority  and  future  influence.  Liberal 
Intergovernmentalism  comes  to  a  very  similar  conclusion  by  attributing  a  “radical  judicial 
activism” to the Court (Moravcsik 1995: 623), but focuses more on the motivations behind the 
governments’ acceptance of the Court’s judgments (see Moravcsik 2002). At first glance, 
Neofunctionalism seems to be opposed to these approaches, but it shares the crucial belief 
in a self-interested and rationally acting Court with a political agenda (Mattli and Slaughter 
1995: 185) and the ambition to gain “prestige and power” (Burley and Mattli 1993: 64) by 
using  law  as  “mask  and  shield”  (Ibid.:  73;  see  also  de  Búrca  2005).  Supranationalism 
concurs: “ ... all legal actors are instrumentally rational, in the sense of generally pursuing 
their own individual or corporate interests, however defined” (Stone Sweet 2004: 37).
6  
Retrospectively,  many  open  questions  remain  in  these  approaches:  which  kind  of 
rationality, exactly, can be ascribed to an institution that consists of twenty-seven judges who 
come  from  different  European  countries  with  distinct  legal  traditions,  all  trained  in  these 
traditions  and  their  national  laws  for  many  years,  who  are  now  sitting  in  different 
constellations in the eight different chambers of the ECJ? Did these judges change their 
personalities the day they moved to Luxembourg so that they reflexively exercise European 
“judicial  activism,”  or  pursue  their  “integrationist  agenda  aggressively  and  with  political 
acumen” (Perju 2009: 330) instead of considering the interests of their individual nations? Or 
does  the  ECJ  as  an  institution  make  the  difference,  changing  the  attitudes  judges  have 
towards law and legal reasoning? Is there a hidden political agenda inherent in the ECJ 
bending the will of judges and advocates general? Even more importantly, from an analytical 
point of view: does the undeniable fact that the ECJ has expanded the reach and scope of 
European law inevitably lead to the conclusion it had an interest in doing so? Is it true that 
cause and effect are one and the same?  
Today, discussions have not moved far beyond this point. Contemporary approaches 
dealing  with  the  ECJ  seem  indeed  to  be  “trapped  in  a  supranational-intergovernmental 
dichotomy” (Branch and Øhrgaard 1999). The core assumptions of early political science 
integration theories prevail – and so do the many open questions. The rationalist “classics” 
obviously determined the perception of the European Court and its work in recent studies, 
just a few of which will be cited here: Höpner sees it as an acknowledged fact in law, political 
science, and sociology that the European Court, by expanding “European law extensively … 
has become an ‘engine of integration’” (Höpner 2010: 3; cf. 2008). For Scharpf there is no 
doubt that the ECJ is willing and “able to exercise policy-making functions” (Scharpf 2006: 
851) and he criticizes the “Court’s power of judicial legislation” (Ibid: 852). Alter, explicitly 
drawing on neofunctionalism as a theoretical basis, typifies the Court as a “political actor in 
Europe” (Alter 2009a: 5) equipped with significant “political power” (Idem 2009c: 287) and 
marked by the will “to expand its own authority” (Idem 2000: 513) and the rule of European 
law by “aggressively interpreting and enforcing ECSC rules” (Idem 2009a: 8). Josselin and 
Marciano highlight the principal-agent relationship between the Court and the EU member 
                                                 
5 For a detailed discussion on the notion of rationality in general see Grimmel 2010b, 2011 and in regard to 
integration theory, Grimmel 2010a. 
6 Stone Sweet adds: “Judges, I expect, will seek to maximize, in addition to their own private interests, at least 
two  corporate  values.  First,  they  will  seek  to  enhance  their  legitimacy,  vis-à-vis  all  potential  disputants,  by 
portraying  their  own  rulemaking  as  meaningfully  constrained  by,  and  reflecting  the  current  state  of,  the  law. 
Second, they will work to strengthen the salience of judicial modes of reasoning vis-à-vis disputes that may arise 
in the future” (2004: 37). A. Grimmel – Integration and the Context of Law: Why the European Court of Justice is not a Political Actor 
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states  by  trying  to  show  “how  a  legal  agent  undertook  actions  and  made  decisions  with 
political  consequences”  (Josselin/Marciano  2007:  72).  Kenney  emphasizes  the  Court’s 
superior position of power vis-à-vis other actors in the EU, concluding that the “ECJ has used 
its judicial power to promote greater European integration” and by so doing “expanded its 
own  power  and  transferred  power  to  national  courts  at  the  expense  of  member  states” 
(Kenney  2000:  597).  Cichowski  (2007),  Selck,  Rhinard  and  Häge  (2007)  and  Carrubba, 
Gabel  and  Hankla  (2008,  see  also  Carrubba  and  Murrah  2005)  contribute  with  empirical 
studies centered on the “strategic behavior by judges in the face of political constraints” (Ibid: 
449) thereby narrowing their cognitive interest to match the assumptions about European law 
made in earlier theoretical approaches (for a close theoretical examination and discussion 
see Grimmel 2010a).  
In summary, current political science research dealing with the ECJ and its work is 
both too narrow and too vast in scope: it is too narrow because it tries to explain integration 
only  by  reference  to  actors  and  their  political-rational  interests.  There  is  no  substantial 
examination  of  the  legal  context  and  its  idiosyncrasies  –  apart  from  the  very  general 
constructivist claim that ideas, norms, identities, roles, etc. matter. At the same time, the 
extent is too vast because European integration was never strictly about politics, but has 
been subject to multiple contexts, each with its own inner logic, rationality, and distinctive 
manner of integration. 
The widely shared conclusion that the ECJ had an interest in expanding the ambit of 
European law into the member states’ national legal systems cannot inevitably deduced from 
the mere fact that it has de facto done so. The law itself, as a self-contained context of 
reasoning and action, must be seen as the intervening variable. It is not only not helpful to 
“situate  courts  in  a  broader  political  context,  with  judges  as  one  actor  among  others 
contributing to outcomes” (Conant 2007: 62), like Conant proposes. From an analytical point 
of view, it is also highly problematic to treat legal actors as political ones and to conclude that 
“showing  how  judicial  influence  varies  depending  on  differences  in  the  configuration  of 
interests  and  institutions”  is  the  “type  of  research  [that]  is  most  likely  to  advance  our 
understanding of legal integration” (Ibidem.). The biggest and most pressing question arising 
here  is:  what  does  it  mean  for  the  European  law  and  the  common  legal  order  if  it  is  a 
dependent variable of actors’ rational interests, as rationalist theories suggest? What does 
that mean for the legitimacy of the EU? Can a judicial system operating on such an interest-
driven foundation ever be accepted? Or will the whole legal system sooner or later plunge 
into  crisis,  since  the  law  would  lose  the  acceptance  of  those  whom  it  concerns  –  the 
European people? 
At  this  point  the  well-intentioned  ambition  of  “building  bridges”  (Zürn  and  Checkel 
2005; Checkel 2005; Johnston 2005; see also Müller 2004) between rationalism and other 
scientific  traditions  like  constructivism  must  necessarily  come  to  an  end,  since  the  entire 
quest for interests, which is a core element of rationalist approaches, seems to be flawed in 
regard to the ECJ, its judges, and the law as a whole. Even to resort to the very basic 
assumption that the European judges must at least have an interest in law must be refused, 
since it is based on a fundamental confusion: judges do not administer justice because they 
have an interest in doing so, but because it is the professional assignment imposed on them 
when they took office. Nobody would ever even think of claiming that a bus driver has an 
interest  in  driving  buses  or  transporting  people,  nor  would  one  conclude  that  the  tax 
accountant has an interest in dealing with taxation, although these are their jobs and they 
might feel dedicated to their work. Interests are neither a meaningful category in law, nor a 
relevant  one.
7  Not  the  interest  in  law,  but  the  law  itself  is  the  key  to  understanding 
“integration through law.” Thus, it becomes necessary to first abandon the  ambitious but 
overstretched research agenda of rationalist integration theory and second, to open up the 
black box of European law (see also Dehousse 2002).  
                                                 
7 With the exception it is codified as object of legal protection. A. Grimmel – Integration and the Context of Law: Why the European Court of Justice is not a Political Actor 
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2.  Opening the Black Box of EU Law – Context Analysis as an Alternative Model  
for Approaching Europe’s Legal Sphere 
European law today is based on a variety of norms, rules, methods, and procedures. 
Not all of these are codified and written down in the texts of the Treaties, or the countless 
initiatives, regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations, and statements originated in 
Brussels and Strasbourg. There is a broad range of legal traditions, doctrines, and approved 
customs, as well as craft-bound forms and methods of interpretation, legal reasoning, and 
argumentation. All of these became “habits” (Hopf 2010) and are widely acknowledged and 
accepted  by  lawyers,  legal  scholars,  and  legal  representatives  throughout  Europe  as 
coercing legally relevant action. In short, the EU’s legal system consists of much more than 
mere statutory provisions and regulations. It constitutes a context – a dense net of commonly 
known  and  accepted  rules  and  procedures  providing  actors  with  reasons  for  meaningful 
action.  
Such a context never causes (cf. Wind, Sindbjerg-Martinsen and Pons-Rotger 2009) 
or  predetermines  either  action  (as  in  “trivial  rationalist”
8  conceptions)  or  categorical 
agreement with action, but provides reasons for action as well as for their acceptance or 
rejection. It is the repository of commonly shared legal knowledge, of doctrines, concepts, 
and arguments, that provide the basis for mutual understanding in Europe’s legal sphere, 
enabling the justification of meaningful action.  
It is the nature of law that there is no “causal mechanism” (Zürn and Checkel 2005: 
1048)  coercively  leading  to  a  certain  conclusion  or  action.  Law  is  a  human  institution 
consisting of legal patterns of how to deal with social problems. In this regard, it should not 
be confounded with formal logic or mathematics where there has to be conclusive evidence 
all the way down. It is not fixed once and for all, but is in constant motion and has to be 
negotiated  over  and  over  again.  However,  this  does  not  mean  that  legal  judgments  are 
subject to arbitrariness or private actor’s interests. Although it needs individuals to apply and 
further develop law, legal argument and decision-making can never be just private acts of 
reasoning or mere “mental exercise.” There are strict rules always guaranteeing a minimum 
of stringency, consistency, coherence, and public verifiability (Strauch 2000, 2002, 2005; on 
coherence in law see Bracker 2000; also Rescher 1973; Coomann 1983; Benoetxea 1993; 
Benoetxea, MacCormick and Moral Soriano 2001).
9 For this very reason this article will not 
center  on  the  “cause-effect  scheme.”  Instead,  I  will  examine  how  the  “reason-decision 
scheme” has to be embedded in the wider context of law to make determinable which claims, 
actions, and judicial judgments are well-founded and compelling in front of the legal audience 









Figure 1: The three dimensions of a context  
                                                 
8 Cf. note 2. 
9 Cf. Strauch 2000, 2002, 2005; on coherence in law see Bracker 2000; also cf. Rescher 1973; Coomann 1983; 
Benoetxea 1993; Benoetxea,MacCormick and Moral Soriano 2001. 
        
               
                          A. Grimmel – Integration and the Context of Law: Why the European Court of Justice is not a Political Actor 
Les Cahiers européens de Sciences Po. – n° 03/2011 
 
10 
The context of European law enables the identification of meaning and action in threefold 
ways, each of which any relevant actors, and especially Europe’s high court, have to refer to. 
Contexts are always distinguishable from other contexts in the following ways (cf. Figure 1):  
First,  every  context  can  be  delimited  by  the  mere  fact  that  it  is  an  autonomous 
societal  institution.  As  such,  it  constitutes  a  functionally  distinct  space  of  meaning  and 
reasoning. Max Weber argued very convincingly in Economy and Society (1922) that modern 
societies have developed several “value spheres” over time, each with its own means and 
ends.  Although  one  does  not  have  to  agree  with  Weber’s  particular  distinction  of  such 
spheres (economy, politics, law, science, religion etc.), his findings are extremely useful for 
understanding  the  autonomy  of  law.  In  modern,  functional,  differentiated  societies,  the 
“sphere of law” forms an independent and acknowledged social space of reasoning. Only 
within its borders do inter-subjective legal reasoning, justification, and acceptance become 
possible.  At  the  same  time,  law  as  a  functional  differentiated  entity  must  be  clearly 
distinguished from the legislative and political democratic processes whose aim is to set and 
negotiate the law. Legal reasoning is, and at least in democratic systems, can never be legal 
politics.  Although  in  effect  both  law  and  politics  elaborate  and  concretize  legal  rules,  the 
specific task of jurisprudence is interpreting, applying, and to some extent, further developing 
laws, which in praxis can neither be self-enforcing nor logically coercive. For this courts and 
their judges have to provide convincing explanations – the basis of which must be certain 
forms  of  argument  that  rationalize  the  actions  within  the  borders  of  a    legal  community, 
thereby distinguishing the context of law from politics. To put it clearly, only the context of law 
and the sum of its acknowledged rules of recognition by the legal community, not the motives 
of actors, can tell which claims and arguments are legitimate and which have to be refused.
10  
Based  on  Toulmin  (1958),  the  basic  and  ineluctable  “reason-decision  scheme”  in 




Figure 2: The basic “reason-decision scheme” in the context of European law 
 
Every judicial argument starts with a relevant claim, like “The national law A in state X is not 
consistent with the law of the EU” or “State Y violates EU law by doing B.” Additionally, there 
has to be a ground that proves the claim in order to validate it. It can take the form of: “The 
national law A in state X hinders the free movement of goods” or “By doing B State Y violates 
fundamental rights (e.g. health, equal treatment, non-discrimination).” There are two types of 
criteria  for  measuring  the  validity  of  a  claim:  first,  it  must  be  consistent.
11  Second,  the 
premises and propositions must be true and sufficiently justified (see Bracker 2000: 199). 
Moreover,  claim  and  ground  have  to  be  backed  by  a  legal  warrant,  which  is  needed  to 
answer the question of why and to what extent the ground is relevant to the claim. However, 
                                                 
10 This does not mean that interests are illegitimate in law per se, but that they have to be transferred into legal 
arguments to be acceptable and considered valid claims. 
11 The conclusion (claim) must directly result from the premise (grounds for the claim). 
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since a legal text can be interpreted in manifold ways, there are commonly shared rules of 
how to interpret a warrant: these are the acknowledged forms of legal argument. They are 
specific to each legal order and must be seen as ways to produce convincing or at least 
acceptable, and therefore legitimate, judicial outcomes.
12 Again, the decision about which 
legal  arguments  and  decisions  are  acceptable  and  which  should  be  refused  is  one  that 
cannot be undertaken by just referring to the form of the reasoning shown in the “reason-
decision scheme” above. It can only be made by asking for the concrete embeddedness and 
justifiability of the argument in the wider context of law. This extends from the institution of 
law in general to European law in particular. 
Second, the European legal system has developed an autonomous order with its own 
forms of legal rationalization that make it locally distinguishable from other legal contexts like 
national law, international law, individual member state law, and non-European legal orders. 
In a local sense, European law is distinct from other legal orders by the fact it is European 
law, possessing a unique legal tradition and genesis. The borders of the context formally 
consist of membership in the European legal community, which constitutes a specific legal 
system providing its own, genuinely European judicial sources and patterns of interpretation, 
legal cognition, and justification. This is particularly apparent in the forms of judicial argument 
that are canonically accepted and commonly used to interpret European law. The rules of 
argument that the ECJ and all the other actors in the European context have to abide by are 
literal, historical, contextual, teleological, and “effet utile”
13 (Figure 2) (for a close examination 
of  legal  argument  in  EU  law  see  Bleckmann  1982;  Benoetxea  1993;  McCormick  1996; 
Anweiler 1997; Benoetxea, MacCormick and Moral Soriano 2001; Seyr 2008; Walter 2009). 
These, together with the stock of legal norms, build the inevitable basis of meaningful action 
in European law – this applies to the adjudication of the Court as much as to its critiques. 
There can never be “acceptance of legal rulings simply because they have the quality of law” 
(Hunt 2007: 155). To develop an inter-subjective “‘persuasion pull’ and ‘compliance pull’” 
(Weiler 1993: 419) judges cannot merely rely on the power bestowed by their institution. 
Instead,  they  have  to  convince  through  compelling  legal  argument  and  rely  on  the 
argument’s  universal  understandability  and  acceptability  within  a  particular  European 
context. What is most characteristic of the local category, however, is the fact that Europe is 
a largely incomplete construct that has to be further developed. The term “Europe” neither 
marks  a  fixed  territory  nor  a  settled  political  or  judicial  system.  Europe  is  in  constant 
movement. This is also true in a temporal sense. 
Third,  European  law  is  extraordinarily  dynamic  and,  with  its  unfinished  character, 
subject  to  multifaceted,  ongoing  changes.  The  rapid  developments  in  the  EC/EU  forced 
politics to adjust the Treaties over and over again. But it was not only politics that had to 
modify the legal order over the course of time. Rather, the law itself had to be constantly 
changed, interpreted, and improved. European law as a context is and must always be a 
historically distinct space that is never identical to other past or future configurations of the 
same (functional or local) context. This is due to the fact that, like every legal system, it is in 
permanent fluctuation. Also, the changing character does not imply that European law came 
into being from nowhere. Nor does it mean it is arbitrary, or can be subject to “activist case 
law of the ECJ” (Bouwen and McCown 2007: 426) or a pro-federalist blueprint. From the 
dawn of the European Community, the contrary has been the case: the comparatively young 
European  legal  order  could  not  have  been  brought  into  being  without  considering  the 
repository of joint legal knowledge and tradition that was and still is the core of the common 
legal system. The same applies to the way the ECJ further develops the law case by case. It 
can only depend on a steadily adjusted nexus of laws, legal insights, doctrines, and rules that 
emerged in Europe over decades and centuries. Surrounded by this broad framework, the 
                                                 
12 This does not necessarily imply that everybody accepts or appreciates the legal decision. 
13 The principle “effet utile” (principle of useful effect or practical effectiveness of EC law) is a principle of judicial 
interpretation in international and European law, favoring the interpretation which best promotes the objectives of 
the treaties and obliges the member states and their courts not to diminish the effectiveness of supranational law 
in their national legal orders. A. Grimmel – Integration and the Context of Law: Why the European Court of Justice is not a Political Actor 
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ECJ has the extraordinary difficult task of ensuring the consistency and historical coherence 
of its decisions. “The Court of Justice … creates its own legitimacy primarily by the internal 
logic and consistency of the actual results expressed in its judgments and by the significance 
of those results for the development of the Community legal order and the continuation of the 
process of integration” as former ECJ Judge Everling once put it (Everling 1984: 1309). This 
means  nothing  less  than  the  necessity  of  maintaining  the  connection  to  its  past  and 
contemporary judgments, as well as foreseeing future problems that might arise through its 
decision-making. Ludwig Wittgenstein once said: “Words have meaning only in the stream of 
life” (Wittgenstein 1981: 173). The same applies to the adjudication and judicial development 
of European law. Only by continuously generating a self-contained and continuous chain of 
consistent and coherent judicial interpretation and adjudication is the Court able to ensure 
the indispensable transparency and acceptability
14 of its judgments. 
In  this  embeddedness  in  a  historical  and  local  specific  context  of  law  and  legal 
reasoning, the ECJ does not differ very much from European national high courts like the 
French Conseil constitutionnel or the German Bundesverfassungsgericht. All of them do not 
act in an empty space, but have to obey certain legally craft-bound and national standards, 
procedures,  and  rules  delimiting  legitimate  from  illegitimate  action,  which  are  subject  to 
permanent transformation. This basic rule applies to all of them: “… propositions of law are 
true [and only therefore have to be accepted, AG] if they figure in or follow from the principles 
of  justice,  fairness,  and  procedural  due  process  that  provide  the  best  constructive 
interpretation of the community’s legal practice (Dworkin 1986: 225)”. Therefore, it is even 
more astonishing that the European Court, but not individual national judiciary bodies, is 
regularly confronted with the allegation of engaging in “legal politics” (Conant 2007; see also 
Josselin and Marciano 2007) or even “radical judicial activism” (Moravcsik 1995: 623). Do the 
national high courts not also quite regularly produce controversial decisions that have far-
reaching  political  implications  that  are  discussed  by  legal  and  political  experts  and  are 
subject  to  broad  debates  on  principles  in  the  media?  Nobody,  however,  would  consider 
accusing  the  Conseil  constitutionnel  or  the  Bundesverfassungsgericht  of  being  political 
actors following their own interests or an agenda. So why don’t we start to treat the ECJ the 
same  way:  as  a  fallible  judicial  actor  that  can  only  rely  on  the  principle  “truth  instead  of 
authority” (Neumann 2005; see also Dobler 2008) and must therefore be criticized by legal 
and not political argument if it is not convincing in its reasons given for a particular judgment.  
The commendable attempt of “building bridges” towards “trivial rationalist” theories 
arguing for a close examination of interest-constellations is futile, at least in the context of 
law, since it is simply irrelevant if a judge has a certain attitude or preferences towards a 
legal issue or case at hand or is a “true believer” (Johnston 2005: 1013). It must be pointed 
out that a judgment has never to prove the integrity or honesty of the judges, but to make a 
convincing argument in the context of the law by the means of the law. On the contrary, the 
judges – although they might have interests, motives, and preferences – always have to step 
back behind their judgments and their rationale for a decision. In other words, the judgments, 
not the judges, must speak for themselves. Otherwise, adjudication would not be about legal 
provisions and their appropriate application, but to show the moral qualities of the human 
beings in charge of interpreting the law. It goes without saying that this, at least in democratic 
political systems, can and must never be the task of the law or any argument.  
Every legal scholar is aware of the fact that judges – in national as well as in the 
European Court’s chambers – can never be totally free of personal considerations. However, 
the Court must rely on its ability to convince; and it can only be convincing by reference to 
the common European legal norms, procedures, and traditions to be able to claim that its 
legal grounds can be understood and accepted by other actors within the same context. If 
and only if the latter is not regularly the case – i.e., if the ECJ constantly produces decisions 
that  are  obviously  biased,  badly  founded,  and  show  no  receptiveness  to  the  critique  of 
                                                 
14 The term “acceptability” does not necessarily imply that everybody appreciates the legal decisions, or that there 
is never dissent or dispute; nor does it mean that there cannot be critique of the Court’s decision-making. A. Grimmel – Integration and the Context of Law: Why the European Court of Justice is not a Political Actor 
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legitimacy problems – the question about interests becomes relevant. The proof or disproof 
of this allegation, however, is still missing, since political science has largely missed out on 
engaging with the context of law and legal argument.  
 
3.  Establishing and Defining the Autonomy of European Law 
and the Myth of Judicial Activism in the “Foundational Period”
15 of Integration 
One  of  the  most  persistent  stories  produced  within  the  rationalist  framework  of 
analysis, repeated over and over again in many prominent studies, is the appraisal that the 
ECJ created the autonomy of European law in the early years of integration driven by a 
political  interest  in  expansionist  lawmaking,  laying  the  cornerstone  for  a  series  of  further 
steps that siphon ever more power from the nation states to the European level – all without 
state  consent  (Josselin  and  Marciano  2007;  Granger  2006;  Kenney  2000;  Alter  2000, 
2009a,b,c; for a good overview see Conant 2007). In this light, the institutionally influential 
cases like Fédéchar
16 and AETR
17 on the principle of implied powers, van Gend en Loos
18 on 
the  principle  of  direct  effect,  Costa/ENEL
19  on  the  principle  of  supremacy,  or  even 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft
20 on the protection of fundamental rights, must appear as 
“original sins” in a continuing story of European judicial empowerment. This story, however, 
is a myth reflecting rationalist theoretical explanatory patterns rather than the actual reasons 
for the European judicial process and the historical circumstances in which the decisions 
were  made.  Here  it  will  be  shown  that  although  the  legal  decisions  of  the  “foundational 
period”  can  be  unhesitatingly  characterized  as  a  “quiet  revolution”  (Weiler  1994) 
spearheaded by the ECJ and had a considerable political impact, they were not only quite 
well founded, but also necessary in light of the historical, local, and functional dimensions of 
the context of the emerging European legal order (see also Everling 1984: 1305). 
To draw a picture that can convincingly explain the ECJ’s role in these early days, it is 
not sufficient to merely state the fact that the Court engaged in an expansionist construction 
of European law. It is essential to be able to answer the pivotal question of how the law was 
developed. But other than noting Alter and Helfer’s recently published article journal, which 
examined how the ECJ established “its legal and political authority” (Alter and Helfer 2010: 
569), the focus here will be not on the fact that the Court possesses a considerable authority, 
but on how the ECJ established autonomy
21 of European law in the early years of integration. 
The former is the rationalist and actor-centered approach, while the latter represents the 
contextual  perspective  that  edges  reasoning  and  action  ever  closer  into  the  center  of 
European  law,  while  simultaneously  accounting  for  the  framework  in  which  it  occurs. 
Explicitly, the aim here is not to provide close judicial argument for or against particular ECJ 
rulings.  To  judge  the  veracity  of  judicial  argumentation  is  and  must  stay  the  task  of 
jurisprudence. The promise of this essay, however, is to offer a more convincing story about 
“integration through law” and to try to understand the Court as a judicial actor rather than a 
political one. 
So, what are the exact demands a judicial actor has to comply with to be considered 
rational within the legal context, and which of these have to be proved here to disprove the 
accusations of “politics in robes”? From the perspective of the context, it is not important to 
                                                 
15 Weiler 1991: 2413; meant is the phase of ECJ jurisdiction starting in the late 1950s and ending in the mid 
1970s.  
16 1956, Case 8/55. 
17 1971, Case 22/70. 
18 1963, Case 26/62. 
19 1964, Case 5/64. 
20 1970, Case 11/70 
21 The word “autonomy” is composed of the ancient Greek words auto=self and nomos=law. Here, the autonomy 
of European law will be referred to as an independent, self-contained space of action and thought no longer 
dependent  on  the  benevolence  of  the  member  states  and  their  political  acceptance  in  interpreting  and 
implementing the laws. A. Grimmel – Integration and the Context of Law: Why the European Court of Justice is not a Political Actor 
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have  the  power  or  opportunity  (i.e.,  because  of  a  certain  institutional  arrangement  or  an 
opportune constellation of interests) to enforce certain preferences. Every action in law has 
to fulfill three basic conditions to be perceivable as rational, legitimate, and acceptable:  
first, in the functional context, it has to be in line with the context-specific rules of 
judicial interpretation and argumentation that delimit law as a social practice from politics and 
other frameworks of reasoning and action;  
second, in the local context, it has to meet the requirements of a shared, genuine, 
European understanding of law, i.e. a basic stock of rules and norms that make European 
law distinguishable from other legal orders and systems, such as international law, the laws 
of a certain member state, or the law of other non-European legal orders;  
third,  in  the  historical  context,  it  has  to  allow  comprehensibility,  connectivity,  and 
acceptability in terms of a common legal practice that can be only meaningful as part of a 
chain  of  political-judicial  achievements  coherent  in  light  of  past,  other  contemporary,  and 
future legal/judicial developments.  
If one can say of an actor that he acts totally in accordance with these basic demands 
imposed on him by the context, the question of motivation necessarily becomes a minor 
matter, since the action must be considered as context-rational and therefore acceptable. It 
has to be emphasized again that this approach does not aim to justify the ECJ’s judgments 
wholesale. Rather, the intent is to suggest context analysis to pave the way for overcoming 
the deadlocked and long-lasting scientific debates on the political role of the Court, and show 
that  it  is  absolutely  necessary  to  take  into  account  the  law  in  order  to  understand  the 
integration process fostered by law.  
The  method  of  context  analysis  used  here  differs  significantly  from  “trivial 
rationalist,”
22 actor-centered, or interest-based explanatory patterns in the way it takes an 
internal perspective on European law. From this point of view, the question is no longer 
about  which  actors  prevail  in  enforcing  or  implementing  their  interests,  or  which  causal 
mechanisms are at work in lawmaking – it has been argued above that both questions are 
largely irrelevant in the context of law – but about the options and limitations of reasoning 
and  action  inherent  in  a  context.  This  does  not  imply  that  actors  do  not  have  their  own 
interests or are mere pawns in the game of European law, but that they are bound to the 
imperatives that are specific to a certain context and shared by the other participants in the 
same  social  framework.  These  rules,  at  the  same  time,  must  delineate  undue  political 
activism from legitimate judicial action. In other words, the issue of whether the European 
Court of Justice is a political rather than a judicial actor has to be decided from within the 
context of law, not politics. Otherwise it would be presumed that law is politics, although this 
explanation must be subsidiary and can only be considered acceptable and valid if there is 
no legal one.
23 
Following  this  line  of  argument,  the  legal  practice  of  the  ECJ  in  the  “foundational 
period” will be contextualized in its historical, functional, and local aspects to examine if the 
context of European law provides sufficient evidence that the rules of law in Europe have 
been  broken  by  politics  or  not.  Debating  the  Court’s  jurisdiction  on  direct  effect  and 
supremacy – which are still the most thoroughly investigated cases in political science – and 
contrasting these to the central suppositions of “trivial rationalist” approaches will test if there 
are compelling explanations within law.  
If this is the case and it can be shown the ECJ used sound legal reasoning in all the 
contexts  examined,  this  must  be  the  intervening  variable  disproving  the  claim  of  “legal 
politics,” as it would be invalid to suspect political motivation in these cases (otherwise the 
critics’  argument  would  obviously  violate  the  essential  separation  of  law  and  politics  and 
                                                 
22 Cf. note 2. 
23 If there is a convincing explanation for the “integration through law” facilitated and promoted by the ECJ, there 
can be at least no good reason to claim the Court would engage in anything other than judicial action. A. Grimmel – Integration and the Context of Law: Why the European Court of Justice is not a Political Actor 
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therefore do what they object to – unduly mix law and politics). The landmark doctrines on 
direct effect and supremacy
24 that have been widely reviewed by political scholars should be 
especially interesting and challenging here, since beyond doubt, the “foundational period” of 
adjudication must still be seen as the most pioneering and prominent one. At the same time, 
the  establishment  of  direct  effect  and  supremacy  must  be  “hard  cases”  for  an  approach 
attempting to refute “judicial activism” due to the fact that they had a highly formative impact 
on the shape of the EU and therefore can be seen as a litmus test of whether or not the 
accusations of legal politics are valid. 
 
Historical Context – the Need for Coherent Adjudication Over Time 
To  assess  if  the  Court’s  decisions  in  the  early  years  of  integration  were  acts  of 
judicially unsubstantiated activism that must be categorized as politically motivated, or if they 
were well-founded within the legal framework of that time, it is essential to first envision their 
institutional  and  contractual  basis  in  the  1950s  and  1960s.  Only  a  few  years  after  the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC, 1951/52) was brought into being as the first 
supranational organization since the end of World War II, the Rome Treaties establishing the 
European Economic Community (EEC, 1957/58) were signed. Unlike the Treaty of Paris, 
which formed the basis of the ECSC, the EEC-Treaty was not a “traité-loi,” but a “traité-
cadre.”
25  As  such,  it  did  not  just  contain  explicit  legal  regulations  for  a  specific  area  of 
common  action,  but  laid  the  cornerstone  of  a  supranational  entity  with  autonomous 
institutions  and  equipped  with  far-reaching  legal  competences  (Haltern  2007:  40).  In  this 
sense, the early European Court of Justice must not be treated as an “International Tribunal” 
(Plender 1983). It is crucial to recognize this very qualitative difference in the Community’s 
legal foundation in order to comprehend the judgments made by the ECJ in the following 
years.  
Second, it is also crucial to bring to mind the particular historical situation in which the 
doctrines  of  implied  powers,  direct  effect,  and  supremacy  were  developed.  This  situation 
should be carefully differentiated from other past and future configurations of the context of 
European  law  –  an  aspect  that  is  often  overlooked  in  rationalist  analysis.  Against  a 
background  of  long  and  devastating  warfare  and  the  great  success  of  the  ECSC,  all  six 
member states made the qualitative step towards deeper integration by signing the Rome 
Treaties in the late 1950s, fully aware of the fact that it was new soil they were stepping on. 
Although there was indeed no agreement about bringing a European federation into being, 
there  was  broad  consent  that  the  old  system  of  nation-states  has  to  be  contained  in  an 
effective institutional structure. The explanation that “the most assertive supranational court 
of that time managed to fly under the radar so successfully” (Perju 2009: 331) and member 
states did not notice the reach of its jurisdiction, on the other hand, is too simplistic and 
historically implausible. The member states knew the consequences of their decision to take 
the  Community  agreement,  including  the  European  Judiciary,  to  a  higher  level  (Mancini 
1989: 595; Mancini and Keeling 1994: 186). But they “displayed little interest in the details of 
the legal system. Instead, they delegated the construction of the judicial system to a Judicial 
Group composed of legal experts, with significant autonomy from member state direction.
26 
This  Group  was  given  broad  authority  in  devising  a  judicial  system”  (Heisenberg  and 
Richmond  2002:  204;  see  also  Everling  1984:  1305).  The  popular  belief  that  the  ECJ 
                                                 
24 All the cases and strains of adjudication chosen here reflect landmark and leading cases that are directly 
related to the doctrines of direct effect and supremacy, or that arise as a consequence from early case-law. They 
all represent middle-of-the-road cases and are part of the canonical repertoire in European jurisprudence and 
most legal textbooks.   
25 A “traité-loi” (law making treaty) is a treaty directly constituting rights and duties for the contracting states and 
it’s the European citizens. A “traité cadre” (framework treaty), in contrast, consciously just states cornerstones and 
possibly an institutional structure, both leaving lacunae and detail questions to be filled out later by political or 
judicial means (Beutler, Bieber, Pipkorn and Streil 1987: 40; Simson and Schwarze 1993: 26, 1995: 75). 
26 For a very instructive study of the social embeddedness of this Judicial Group and the circumstances of that 
time see Vauchez 2008, 2010. A. Grimmel – Integration and the Context of Law: Why the European Court of Justice is not a Political Actor 
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extended European rules constraining national sovereignty far beyond the member states’ 
original intent (see Alter 2010: 563-564) is true only in so far as the historical legislator could 
not  foresee  all  the  cases  and  judicial  problems  that  might  one  day  arise  in  Europe’s 
unfinished  Community  and  had  to  grant  the  Court  a  considerable  leap  of  faith  in  the 
conscientious and competent development of the legal system by judicial interpretation.  
From an empirical point of view, it is interesting to note that even as the wind began 
to change some years later in wake of de Gaulle’s self-confident nationalist politics in the 
mid-1960s, the states did not show any serious incentive to disempower the Court, overturn 
its rulings, and go back to the modus of the ECSC Treaty (For a historical overview see also 
Grimmel and Jakobeit 2009; Heisenberg and Richmond 2002). This should have been the 
logical consequence from a rationalist perspective, since there should have been a broad 
convergence of interests, only few players,
27 and a strong motivation to cut back the Court’s 
power among the six member states in order to correct or amend the Treaty under Article 
236 EECT, which demanded unanimity.  
So, why did the nation states not act to reverse the Court’s decisions if they could? 
The reason lies in the nature of law itself. Whereas political decision-making might be based 
on earlier decisions and bound to a set of formal and informal institutional arrangements, 
jurisdiction  and  judicial  law-making  is  bound  by  very  strict  laws  and  specific  rules  of 
recognition. Although it is possible to just make or refuse decisions on the basis of certain 
interests in politics, this was never a feasible path for judicial decision-making. Reference to 
former judgments (if available), shared legal knowledge and common legal traditions, as well 
as compelling or convincing strains of argument, have always been minimum requirements 
for  securing  acceptability.  Moreover,  the  Court  had  produced  consistent  and  coherent 
decisions  over  time,  ensuring  the  required  comprehensibility  in  law.  By  fulfilling  these 
demands, and only by fulfilling these, it has not provided enough reason to taint the further 
development of European law politically and call Europe’s newly established legal sphere 
into question.  
The fact that the landmark cases have not just been decided by the judges on an ad-
hoc basis but had to be constantly unfolded over time, taking into account earlier precedents 
and existing jurisprudence and trying to anticipate future judicial problems, can be depicted in 
the chain of judgments concerning the direct and indirect implementation of directives that 
arose as a logical consequence of van Gend en Loos and Costa/ENEL: Becker,
28 Marshall 
I,
29  Kolpinghuis  Nijmegen,
30  Fratelli  Costanzo,
31  Marleasing,
32  Francovich,






38 These constitute 
an  excellent  example  of  a  typical  strain  of  judgments  in  which  the  Court  has  repeatedly 
interrelated its decisions over a period of twenty years,
39 developing legal doctrines step by 
step as it felt its way forward in the dark of legal lacunae.
40  
                                                 
27  The  Community  just  consisted  of  six  members  in  those  days  (Belgium,  France,  Italy,  Luxembourg,  the 
Netherlands and Germany).  
28 1982, Case 8/81. 
29 1986, Case 152/84. 
30 1987, Case 80/86. 
31 1989, Case 103/88. 
32 1990, Case C-106/89. 
33 1991, Case C-6/90. 
34 1993, Case C-271/91. 
35 1994, Case C-91/92. 
36 1997, Case 129/96. 
37 1999, Case C-131/97. 
38 2000, Case C-443/98. 
39 It should be added that all these cases did not come up overnight, but were slowly developed over a period of 
about forty years. 
40  Lacunae  are  not  only  blank  spaces  in  the  legal  basis,  but  also  include  Treaty  provisions  that  lack  legal 
consistency and coherency with the other objectives of the Treaty. A. Grimmel – Integration and the Context of Law: Why the European Court of Justice is not a Political Actor 
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At this point, one could object that there could still be a secret plan “to reduce the 
domain of national autonomy … and create the conditions for the gradual Europeanization of 
national  administration  and  judging”  (Stone  Sweet  2004:  232),  hidden  behind  a  veil  of 
legalese  and  that  the  ongoing  process  of  judicial  lawmaking  is  its  proof  rather  than  its 
disproof. To verify this assumption, however, would require two things: that the strains of 
adjudication  emanating  from  the  early  landmark  cases  reflect  a  linear,  rather  than  a 
continuous process (the contrary would be empirical evidence to counter political motivation), 
and that there is no convincing justification making the adjudication acceptable within law 
(the contrary would be the intervening variable in a political explanation). This directly leads 
us to the functional context.  
 
Functional Context – Crossing the Dividing-Line Between Law and Politics? 
   Three questions have to be addressed here in regard to the “foundational period” to 
counter the claim of “judicial politics”: first, if the ECJ and its judges had the competency to 
develop such momentous legal doctrines as Fédéchar, van Gend en Loos, Costa/ENEL and 
Internationale  Handelsgesellschaft,  or  if  the  judicial  development  of  the  law  crossed  the 
divide into politics right from the beginning; second, if it was imperative or at least necessary 
to develop the doctrines, and third, presupposing answers to the former questions, if the 
Court’s justifications delivered as grounds for its decisions have been reasonable in law – i.e. 
understandable, acceptable, and therefore legitimate. 
The  first  question  is  relatively  easy  to  answer,  although  not  uncontested  in 
jurisprudence and political science. Keeping the historical circumstances in mind, and on the 
basis  of  the  objective  of  the  Treaty  being  the  establishment  of  a  Community  with 
supranational institutions – which must have implied building a legitimate governing system 
in which the separation of powers is secured – Art. 164 EECT
41 must be read in a broad 
sense, equipping the ECJ with far-reaching competencies. The European Court of Justice 
was  never  thought  to  be  a  panel  of  judges  merely  dependent  on  the  goodwill  of  its 
contracting parties, like the International Court of Justice or the European Court of Human 
Rights.
42 As the Community’s judiciary body, it was commissioned to balance the shift of 
legislative and executive power and to construct a legal system that brings the objectives of 
the Treaty to fruition and therefore “breathe life into the Treaty” (Weatherill 1995: 185).  
To answer the second question about the legal necessity of the Court’s doctrines, we 
have to take a closer look at the reasons for its decisions. Here it becomes apparent that the 
perception  of  an  expansion  of  European  law  in  order  to  undermine  the  autonomy  of  the 
member states or to carry any other interest into effect is a caricature of the decisions: the 
doctrines  developed  in  the  “foundational  period”  –  not  only  in  the  ECJ’s  protection  of 
fundamental  rights  in  Internationale  Handelsgesellschaft  –  have  been  invaluable  and 
absolutely indispensable in helping European citizens to assert their legitimate rights and to 
be protected by law. The ECJ laid down the necessary constitutional basis that served to 
protect  the  legitimate  expectations  of  the  people  living  under  the  rule  of  the  European 
Community,  rather  than  willfully  trying  to  “pursuing  an  integrationist  project”  (Perju  2009: 
331). It was not by chance that the Court, only a few years later, affirmed the principle of 
protecting legitimate expectations in the cases Commission v Council,
43 Westzucker
44 and 
Einfuhr-  und  Vorratsstelle  Getreide
45;  and  the  principle  of  legal  certainty  in  Brasserie  de 
                                                 
41 In text: “The Court of Justice shall ensure observance of law and justice in the interpretation and application of 
this Treaty.” See also Art. 169, second paragraph, 170, 173, 175, 177-180, 228 EECT. 
42 In general, it also has to be kept in mind that law as an institution – at least, as long as it is effective – must 
never be reliant on the wills of those concerned in a particular case to accept a certain rule or provision. It is the 
essence of law that it is a repository of accepted rules that, once established, cannot be changed by individual 
actors on an ad-hoc basis.  
43 1973, Case 81/72. 
44 1973, Case 1/73. 
45 1975, Case 4/75. A. Grimmel – Integration and the Context of Law: Why the European Court of Justice is not a Political Actor 




46, BRT v Sabam
47 and Minestère Public v Asjes.
48 Both the protection of legitimate 
expectations and the principle of legal certainty aim to strengthen the position of individuals 
and safeguard the citizens’ confidence in the law (cf. also Usher 1998: 54-57, 65-67).
49  
In sum, the ECJ did not only possess the competence to act, but was also called into 
action in order to ensure legal protection for the European people. Without the supremacy 
and direct effect of Community law there would have been no binding effect for the European 
institutions and states at all. Nor would there have been effective legal control over European 
politics. As the ECJ argued in 1964, which is still very convincing today, “the obligations 
undertaken under the Treaty establishing the Community would not be unconditional, but 
merely  contingent,”  not  directly  providing  individuals  with  any  rights,
50  while  political 
integration and the transfer of competences to the supranational level moved forward. It has 
to be clear that this would have primarily meant an erosion of political control by the people, 
not the states, since recourse to national courts in cases concerning European regulations or 
directives would have been impossible (cf. Weatherill 1995: 117). For these reasons it must 
never  have  been  the  intention  of  the  founding  states,  acting  on  behalf  of  the  European 
people,
51 to install a judiciary that is merely “la bouche qui prononce les paroles de la loi” 
(Montesquieu),
52 but instead to create and enforce an institution that helps to fill the young 
and incomplete legal order with life and facilitates legal certainty and trust (Heisenberg and 
Richmond 2002: 206).  
To continue the previous discussion about the historical context and to answer the 
third question about the legal justification of the early landmark cases, we have to take a 
closer  look  at  specific  rules  of  legal  rationalization  by  which  the  functional  context  of 
European law is characterized in the phase of establishing direct effect and supremacy. It 
seems to be beyond controversy that the ECJ never shied away from the formal demands 
imposed by the “reason-decision scheme” (cf. Figure 2, above) in its rationales for decision. 
However,  the  argument  that  the  judges  have  detached  themselves  from  the  texts  of  the 
Treaties by arbitrarily using teleological arguments in order to enhance the European rule of 
law keeps coming up over and over again in critical studies on the ECJ (see e.g. Alter and 
Helfer 2010: 569; Höpner 2008: 29; Perju 2009: 369; Rasmussen 1986: 526).
53 Although this 
assumption might be quite valid, presupposing political judicial actors, it is not covered by 
empirical evidence and cannot be supported in context. While it is true for the early decisions 
in the 1950s and 1960s that the Court had to use teleological arguments in the absence of 
clear legal provisions, the rulings of the following years, in contrast, show another picture. 
The preferred forms of judicial argumentation shifted and contextual arguments concerning 
the coherence of the common legal order, as well as, most notably, the “effet utile” (principle 
of  effectiveness),
54  moved  to  the  center  of  the  ECJ’s  reasoning  in  influential  cases 
concerning  the  implementation  and  embodiment  of  supremacy  and  direct  effect,  like 
Leberpfennig
55,  van  Duyn





                                                 
46 1973, Case 48/72. 
47 1974, Case 127/73. 
48 1986, Cases 209-213/84. 
49 This motive already appears in the very early case Algera, 1957/58, Joined Cases 7/56 and 3-7/57. 
50 “This view is confirmed by the preamble to the Treaty which refers not only to governments but to peoples. It is 
also confirmed more specifically by the establishment of institutions endowed with sovereign rights, the exercise 
of which affects Member States and also their citizens.” (van Gend en Loos, Case 26/62, 1963, ECR 1). 
51 See also preamble of the EECT. 
52 “The mouth that pronounces the words of the law,” also acknowledged by the German Federal Constitutional 
Court in the case Kloppenburg in 1987, BVerfGE 75, 223. 
53 For the forms of argument cf. Figure 2, above. 
54 See note 13. 
55 1970, Case 9/70. 
56 1974, Case 41/74. 
57 1978, Case 106/77. 
58 1983, Case 205-215/82. 
59 1987, Case 314/85. 
60 1990, Case C-217/88. A. Grimmel – Integration and the Context of Law: Why the European Court of Justice is not a Political Actor 









At this point, it might be objected that the Court just picked the forms of argument that 
best  supported  its  interests,  e.g.  in  expanding  the  ambit  of  European  law  or  the  Court’s 
power vis-à-vis the nation states. In light of empirical evidence, however, this explanation is 
unconvincing, since it is far from true that all cases brought to Luxembourg were decided in 
favor of the expansion of EU law;
65 not even in cases where the ECJ must have been in a 
good  strategic  situation  to  pursue  pro-integrationist  or  other  interests.  In  CILFIT,
66  for 
example,  the  Court  restricted  its  own  further  jurisdiction,  and  in  Francovich  the  Court 
reconsidered and revised its earlier judgments on state liability made in Russo v AIMA
67 and 
Rewe  v  Hauptzollamt  Kiel
68;  also,  in  Grant,
69  Dori,
70  Keck
71  and  Greenpeace,
72  the 
Commission’s executive competences in financial matters were brought under better legal 
control. Another interesting strain of decisions emerging from the doctrine of direct effect can 
be found in Marshall I, Faccini Dori, and Unilever. Here, the judges repeatedly rejected the 
general horizontal direct effect of directives. This must be even more astonishing from the 
viewpoint  of  rationalist-marked  contemporary  integration  theory,  since  recognizing  claims 
concerning  private  individuals  relying  on  unimplemented  directives  would  have  led  to  an 
enormous boost in the enforcement of Community law, and the ECJ had extremely good 
chances of being successful in its ruling: in the course of the Single European Act (SEA, 
1986/87) and the Treaty of Maastricht (TEU, 1992/93), the member states and European 
institutions displayed a strong will to take further steps towards deeper integration. Therefore, 
the opportunity to expand the law further into the national legal systems must have been 
perfect.  Nevertheless,  not  until  Mangold
73  did  the  judges  see  the  necessity  of  carefully 
claiming a general principle of horizontal direct effect of directives.  
In conclusion, judicial development of European law in regard to the establishment 
and embodiment of autonomy appears to be more of a constant and continuous process, not 
a  linear  one  that  points  in  just  one  direction.  The  ECJ  notably  followed  a  differentiated 
adjudication rather than merely deciding in favor of the proponents of an ever-closer union. 
Therefore,  all  three  questions  have  to  be  answered  in  a  way  that  casts  into  doubt  the 
rationalist claim of the ECJ as an actor engaging in pro-federalist politics. The ECJ has not 
only had the competency to act and formulate the groundbreaking doctrines of direct effect 
and  supremacy,  but  it  was  necessary,  and  legitimate  to  develop  such  momentous  legal 
doctrines within the legal context. 
 
Local Context – Marking Off a Distinct European Legal Order 
A common misunderstanding in numerous studies – not only rationalist ones – is the 
appraisal  that  the  European  Court  and  EU  law  can  be  directly  measured  against  other 
                                                 
61 1991, Case C-143/88. 
62 1996, Case C-46/93. 
63 1996, Case 48/93 
64 2003, Case Rs. C-224/01 
65 Nor is it true that the ECJ paid no attention to the perception of its judgments. Although the judges did not pay 
much attention to political opinions, they always showed sensibility towards the legal opinions and reasoning of 
national high courts. The judges in Luxembourg are indeed receptive to legal arguments, but not political ones; 
e.g.  in  case  of  the  German  Bundesverfassungsgericht  in  the  decisions  Solange  I  (1974),  Solange  II  (1986), 
Maastricht (1993) and Banana Market Regulation (2000, cf. also Everling 1996). 
66 1982, Case 238/81. 
67 1976, Case 60/75. 
68 1981, Case 158/80. 
69 1998, Case C-249/96. 
70 See above. 
71 1993, Case C-267/91. 
72 1998, Case C-321/95. 
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national  or  international  courts  and  their  legal  systems.  Although  it  is  true  that  there  are 
several concordances between the European and other legal systems and it might be indeed 
interesting  to  compare  these  with  other  political-administrative  entities,  it  should  be 
emphasized that by definition, European law must be neither international nor national law. It 
is a legal system sui generis, comparably young and still struggling for emancipation from 
individual  national  legal  systems  as  well  as  from  the  international  legal  order.
74  Most 
characteristic of this genuinely European system is the fact that it was and is far from being 
settled, although many legal gaps have been closed. This applies to political legislation, as 
well as to judicial aspects of interpreting and applying the law. In this respect, the ECJ’s work 
is  unique  and  has  to  be  clearly  differentiated  from  that  of  other  constitutional  Courts. 
Analogies to international or supranational appellation bodies like the International Court of 
Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, or the Andean Court of Justice (see Alter and 
Helfer 2010), as well as national European high courts and even the U.S. Supreme Court,
75 
fall  too  short.  Furthermore,  such  analogies  are  out  of  the  question,  since  the  rules  of 
recognition cannot be directly transferred from either the national, international, or specific 
national  legal  orders  to  the  European  context,  although  it  might  be  true  that  the  formal 
institutional arrangements are similar.
76  
The  European  Court  most  notably  has  to  perform  the  balancing  act  of  further 
developing  a  legal  system  with  an  unknown  destination,  while  simultaneously  staying 
connected to the settled legal knowledge and traditions of all the member states to ensure 
enduring trust in the legitimacy of its jurisdiction. From a judicial point of view, this is an 
extraordinarily  challenging  and  difficult  situation  that  is  aggravated  by  the  fact  that  the 
legislator  still  avoids  and  even  rejects
77  stating  the  exact  legal  nature  of  the  European 
community  (something  in  between  confederation  and  federation  on  the  road  to  an  “ever 
closer union among the peoples of Europe”
78). The Court does not have the luxury of a long 
history of genuine European case-law, like the European national courts do. There were 
simply  no  available  precedents  that  could  have  served  as  points  of  reference  for  legal 
interpretation and adjudication – just the vast number of 248 Articles of the Treaty (see also 
Everling 2000: 221). Lord Denning, senior appellate judge of England, once described the 
situation  as  follows:  the  Treaty  “lays  down  general  principles,  it  expresses  aims  and 
purposes. All in sentences of moderate length and commendable style, but it lacks precision. 
It uses words and phrases without defining what they mean. An English lawyer would look for 
an interpretation clause, but he would look in vain. There is none. All the way through the 
Treaty, there are gaps and lacunae. These have to be filled by judges, or by regulations or 
directives.”
79  
At the same time, the judges never had – qua foundational assignment – the option of 
rejecting the jurisdiction of admissible cases or preliminary reference (“déni de justice”), nor 
did they have the opportunity to pass decisions about justice or injustice on to the legislator, 
although the Treaties often contained no case-adequate provisions (see Schumann 1968; 
Hofmann 2000: 250; also Heisenberg and Richmond 2002: 206). The ECJ never made a 
secret  of  this  need  to  fill  the  lacunae  by  judicial  means,  but  stated  it  explicitly  from  the 
beginning, as documented in Algera: “[F]or the solution of [the problem at hand] the Treaty 
does not contain any rules. Unless the Court is to deny justice it is therefore obliged to solve 
                                                 
74 Cf. AETR (1971, Case 22/70), biological resources of the sea (1976, Case 6/76), WTO report (1994); Open 
Skies  (2002,  Case  C-476/98),  Kupferberg  I  (1982,  Rs.  104/81),  banana  regime  (1994,  Case  C-280/93),  Dior 
(2000, Case C-300/98, C-392/98), Yusuf (2005, Case T-306/01). 
75 E.g. Caporaso/Tarrow 2009: 613, Kenney 2000. 
76 Like in case of the Court of Justice created by the Andean Community of Nations in 1979, which indeed has 
been inspired by the institutional framework of the European Community.   
77 This can be seen most recently in case of the negotiations about the Constitutional Treaty and the Lisbon 
Treaty.  
78 EEC Treaty, preamble. 
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the problem by reference to the rules acknowledged by the legislation, the learned writing 
and the case-law of the member states.”
80 
In short, the ECJ was thrown into a double bind right from the very beginning, which 
must be seen as typical for the nature of the whole EU integration project, not just Europe’s 
legal sphere. This dilemma is at the heart of all the well-known leading cases of the early 
days. In each of these, be it Algera, Fédéchar and AETR, van Gend en Loos or Costa/ENEL, 
the Treaty lacked sufficiently clear provisions, although it must have been obvious from the 
viewpoint  of  the  legislator  that  these  general  questions  about  the  implementation  and 
enforcement of Community law would arise sooner or later. Yet, this must be seen as the 
difficult  basic  condition  of  a  “European  way”  of  judicial  interpretation,  characteristic  and 
symptomatic especially of the foundational period. In this sense, the claim that the ECJ is a 
“political Court” or has been activist is neither convincing nor acceptable (Ward 2009: 81). 
From  the  perspective  of  the  specific  situation  in  Europe’s  community  of  law,  not  judicial 
activism but the lack of legislative activism (that was surely promoted by the Community’s 
political architecture) was the problem in the early years of integration and forced the Court 
to act.  
 
Conclusion 
In rationalist theory, jurisdiction is interest- or even agenda-based decision-making in 
the  judge’s  chambers  –  it  is  “politics  in  robes”.  This  assumption  turns  out  to  be  a  myth 
considering the context of law. The ECJ had good reasons for emancipating Community law 
from the political influence of the nation states.  
The need for political science and EU integration studies to engage in-depth with 
different contexts of reasoning and action is displayed very clearly in the numerous studies 
on the ECJ and the “foundational period.” From a rationalist viewpoint, the creation of the 
Court’s influential doctrines must look like a story of European judicial empowerment. On 
closer inspection, however, the developments that led to the establishment of the doctrines 
of direct effect and supremacy and beyond have not only been quite relevant and necessary 
in light of the historical circumstances, they were also judicially well-founded within Europe’s 
nascent legal community.  
Without a doubt, sometimes the line between the indispensable development of law 
by judges and illegitimate judge-made law is not easy to draw, and should therefore be a 
point  of  particular  attention.  Autonomy  of  European  law  does  not  mean  immunity  from 
criticism.  Quite  the  contrary,  critique  is  indeed  appropriate  and  indispensable,  since  “the 
Court of Justice is not immune from human error” (Everling 1996: 435), as Judge Everling 
once put it. However, the line of current argumentation and criticism is flawed. The fact that 
the ECJ shaped European integration from the beginning does not necessarily mean it had 
political motives in doing so. Nor was setting up a common European legal system just a 
“power struggle” the ECJ fought “with the help of the definitional power (symbolic capital) 
available to it” (Münch 2008: 541). Rather, the Court had and still has to help to build the 
Community’s legal order by means of law embedded in certain non-arbitrary circumstances 
that have been shown in this article to be exemplary for the “foundational period.” At no time 
did this have to imply that jurisprudence was dependent on politics or engaged in politics. 
Consequently,  fair  criticism  has  to  be  about  law,  not  politics,  as  long  as  we  can  find 
compelling explanation within the context of law. For this reason, the preoccupation with the 
European Court should begin to reflect the shape of national discussions. This does not have 
to mean that it is perceived as a federal legal order (Josselin and Marciano 2007), or that it is 
comparable to the well-established national legal orders. It just suggests taking European 
law seriously, accepting and respecting it as what it has long been since the early years of 
the EEC – an independent context of reasoning and action.  
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